THE BALKAN PACT AND AMERICAN POLICY

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The Balkan Pact of 1953 represents a period of collective security in a region more typically characterized by turmoil and mutual suspicion. Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia set aside their differences to achieve goals whose importance outweighed the long-standing tensions that had separated them. Despite important historical parallels to the Balkan Pact—most significantly the anti-Bulgarian coalition of the Second Balkan War—historians have largely treated the Balkan Pact as either a temporary aberration in the course of Balkan politics, or as an artificial product of American intervention.¹ In contrast to these views, American documents both reveal hitherto unknown facets of the Balkan Pact and also suggest that Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia quite effectively worked past their animosities to create a military alliance which served their needs. At the same time, they parried attempts by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to control their independent actions.

Since 1949 Greece had explored the feasibility of a three-way link among Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. Though most scholars have identified early 1952 as the beginning of movement towards a Balkan entente, the Greek military had advocated such an alliance much earlier. On October 28, 1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson met with Greek Foreign Minister Constantine Tsaldaris and Greek Ambassador to the United States Vassili Dendrakis to discuss Greek membership in collective security organizations. They presented Acheson a memorandum prepared by General Stylianos Kitirakis advocating "a defensive pact for the areas immediately east of the countries included in the North Atlantic Pact," and concluding that "Creation ... of a Balkan Bloc consisting of Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia will greatly contribute to the maintenance of World Peace." Acheson reacted with only a neutral acknowledgement that the United States would duly consider what might be the best course of action in the Balkans.² To Acheson, a Balkan Pact did not seem feasible, and he certainly did not
make such a pact an American priority. While the Korean War and Turkey's push for admission to NATO would prevent him from further exploration of a Balkan Entente, the Greeks did not let Acheson's reaction discourage them.

North Korea's invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950 may or may not have been Stalin's handiwork, but the United States government certainly perceived it as directed from Moscow. The invasion of South Korea produced the belief that further Communist aggression was imminent, particularly in Southeastern Europe. In July 1950 the Central Intelligence Agency reported an "increase in military preparations in Southeastern Europe... especially in Bulgaria towards the frontiers with Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey." The Joint Intelligence Committee shared this view, describing Greece as a "likely target" of Communist aggression. The American intelligence community similarly saw Yugoslavia as vulnerable to military attack from the Communist satellites even without direct Soviet assistance. Though the CIA had argued in 1949 that the Yugoslav army was capable of defeating any attack made solely by satellite armed forces, a 1950 intelligence report reversed this judgment and offered no hope for the Yugoslavs. Even with Western logistical assistance, the CIA believed, extended Yugoslav resistance was unlikely.

In this atmosphere of increasing danger, Turkey began pressing the United States for admission to NATO. In Turkey, where the desire to join NATO was much stronger than in Greece, the change of government produced by the electoral victory of the Democratic party triggered Turkey's push for NATO membership. On July 30, only a month after the invasion of South Korea, the new Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes delivered an aide-mémoire to the American ambassador requesting closer collaboration with the United States and some action on Turkish membership in NATO. By August 17 Secretary of State Dean Acheson described the American government as "under considerable pressure from Turkey" to support its bid for NATO membership. America's lack of response produced still more pressure. Prime Minister Menderes and Foreign Minister Fuad Köprülü visited the American embassy in August to explain Turkey's position "in view of the recent intensification of the world crisis." The Turkish ambassador to the United States followed this with a personal call on Acheson. The Turkish government invested further capital in NATO membership by publicizing the issue in the Turkish press, thereby placing further pressure on Acheson through raising the cost of rejecting the Turkish bid.

The United States refused to support Turkey's 1950 campaign. The primary factor in America's reluctance to back extending NATO was fear of the Soviets, or, more precisely, doubt in America's ability to defend Western Europe, let alone any far-flung commitments, from Soviet attack. First and most importantly, American planners saw no possibility of offering significant military assistance to Turkey or Greece (assuming that neither could be admitted to NATO without the other) in the even of war. In a telegram to the Embassy in Greece, a still-undecided Acheson asked for comments on Greek membership in NATO: given that the NATO powers "cannot commit substantial forces to G[reece] and T[urkey] in event of war, will net effect incl GT be more harmful than not?" Harold Minor, the Chargé in Greece, shared Acheson's doubts. Admission to NATO without corresponding support would cause "great, perhaps dangerous weakening popular support for pro-Western alignment Greece," though Minor on balance supported Greece's bid for NATO membership. A State Department policy paper made the amazing assessment that if Greece and Turkey were admitted to NATO, their security might in fact decrease as those two states became shocked and demoralized after discovering NATO's true inability to protect them.

The American military joined the diplomats of the State Department in not wishing to see Greece and Turkey in NATO, as American armed forces lacked the resources to properly defend Western Europe, let alone extended commitments in Greece and Turkey. Acheson had written Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson on August 31 to find out the views of the Defense Department on the NATO question. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reported that extending the NATO umbrella was unwise, as "the defense of Western Europe is of the greatest importance... inclusion of Turkey and Greece as full members in NATO might adversely affect the progress which is now evident." The Chiefs had no objection in principle to extending NATO membership "as soon as the defense of the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is reasonably assured." The State Department echoed this particular military view: "the development of the organization of the North Atlantic Treaty and of the necessary defensive strength among the Treaty countries has not progressed sufficiently to permit
the extension of NATO membership to other countries [Greece and Turkey].

Finally, policymakers feared that Greece and Turkey's inclusion would prove provocative to the Soviets because of its implications for the American position in Iran. Acheson feared that the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO without corresponding guarantees to Iran would signal both to the Iranians and to the Soviets that the West considered Iran outside its sphere of vital interests. Henry Grady, the American ambassador, warned that excluding Iran from NATO would provide the Soviets with a devastating propaganda weapon, and that including Iran in NATO would provoke an aggressive Soviet response. His solution to this dilemma: keep both Turkey and Greece out of NATO. These objections led Acheson to refuse to support Turkey's NATO bid. On September 13 in New York, he met British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman. There they agreed on a statement which announced that "at the present... it would not be feasible" to extend the Treaty to include new countries. Deputies from the other NATO states concurred with this position when it was presented to them, though Italy in particular wished to leave the door open to Turkish membership sometime in the future. Acheson told the Turkish ambassador of the NATO decision on September 19. He tried to ease the blow to Turkish morale by offering Turkey the opportunity to participate in plans for joint defense of the Mediterranean, though this was far less than Turkey had expected. America's initial refusal to admit Greece and Turkey into NATO bit deeply into Turk national pride. On October 2, 1950, in spite of the humiliation of their rejection, Turkey accepted NATO's offer to coordinate defense planning, and the next day a similar offer was made to Greece. It was also quickly accepted.

The Greeks had not strived for NATO membership as had the Turks, probably because they never lost sight of the possibility of a Balkan Entente. The Greeks had not been discouraged by Acheson's cool response to their suggestion, and were not distracted from the pursuit of a Balkan Entente by Greece and Turkey's problem-free entry into NATO in 1951. In 1950 and 1951, Greece pressed forward unilaterally to improve relations with Turkey and Yugoslavia. The Turkish government had not placed any priority on regional collective security, as its emphasis was clearly on NATO membership, but the Turks quickly proved responsive to Greek overtures. Yugoslavia proved a tougher problem. Tito announced publicly in 1951 that he had no interest in a three-way alliance among Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia.

Greece and Yugoslavia had normalized relations at the end of 1950, and signed several trade and economic agreements in early 1951, but Yugoslavia was reluctant to go further. By the beginning of 1952, Greece and Turkey had agreed to cooperate in simultaneously working to bring Yugoslavia into a formal accord. The greatest stumbling blocks were Yugoslavia's formidable internal constraints against moving closer to the capitalist West. Not only were Tito and his Yugoslav state still Marxist, but Tito also saw little point in freeing himself from Soviet domination only to fall under Western control.

In early 1952, Greece and Turkey both appealed to the United States to assist them by pressing Yugoslavia to commit itself to a commitment to mutual defense, but Acting Secretary of State Webb declined. The United States was not prepared to hold staff talks with Yugoslavia itself, and so felt it could not itself push Yugoslav military cooperation with the Greeks and Turks. Along with lack of interest at the top, the State Department's organizational structure also hindered effective implementation of such a policy. Within the State Department, Greece and Turkey both fell under Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, but individual diplomats rarely crossed over from one state to another during the course of their careers. Making regional policy was correspondingly more difficult. At one point, Acheson had to remind the diplomats in Ankara and Athens to share information directly and not merely relay it through Washington.

Still, after Greek and Turkish diplomacy had achieved substantial progress in improving relations with Yugoslavia, American policymakers reacted as if they had been presented with a surprise gift. Once the workability of some alignment was proven, American support materialized. American diplomatic personnel served both as channels of communication among the Balkan states and as sources of political intelligence in order to push the rapidly warming relations between the three Balkan states towards formal links, though it appears this never took the form of direct diplomatic leverage. As one example, the Turks used American Ambassador Allen in Belgrade to predict the Yugoslav response to particular Turkish overtures. Despite this, any American actions in this period to expedite the signing of some sort of treaty were purely secondary; the initiative lay in the Balkans.
George McGhee, ambassador to Turkey, summed up the American role in the initial stages of negotiating the Pact: "With little advice or encouragement from the Western powers, three countries have on their own made commendable progress in worth while project." Though other historians have argued that Greece and Turkey were acting at the behest of the United States, the archival record clearly shows that initiative lay in the Balkans.

From 1952 through early 1953, sheer persistence wore down Yugoslav resistance. Turkish persuasion, which was not handicapped by the same recent tensions that afflicted the Greeks, may have been the key to finally convincing the Yugoslav government of the need for a Balkan Pact. The pace of official visits in the Balkans stepped up, and the pace of negotiations likewise accelerated. A Yugoslav military mission visited Greece and Turkey in September 1952, and Greece reciprocated in November. 1953 began with a January tour by Foreign Minister Köprülü to Belgrade and Athens, followed by a February visit by Greek Foreign Minister Stephanos Stephanopoulos to Yugoslavia. From February 20 to 22, diplomats from the three states met in Athens and drafted a preliminary text for a friendship treaty, and on February 28, plenipotentiaries of Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia signed the Pact of Ankara, a treaty of "friendship and cooperation," along with several trade agreements. Besides abstract declarations of peaceful intent, the Pact also called for regular meetings of the three Foreign Ministers and a Permanent Secretariat to handle day-to-day administration of the Pact.

This collection of strange bedfellows seems especially strange given the long-term conflicts that divided and still divide the Balkans. It is thus no coincidence that the Pact of Ankara repeated the anti-Bulgarian coalition of the Second Balkan War. Though the proposed alliance was in a general sense aimed at checking Soviet expansionism, it was more immediately directed at Bulgaria. All three states had good reason to fear Bulgarian attack. In the late 1940's and early 1950's, Bulgaria was considered to have the best trained and equipped army of all the communist states in Eastern Europe, equipped with at least five to six hundred, and perhaps as many as nine hundred, Soviet T-34 tanks. Before World War II, Bulgaria had both a tradition of Russophobia and a large Communist party. This made Bulgaria more politically reliable, and her troops were correspondingly better disciplined and received more Soviet weaponry. Tito's break with the Soviets had left him with good cause to keep a watchful eye on the USSR and its satellites. Turkey, which despite the Turkish minority in Bulgaria found its relations with Sofia less strained than Yugoslavia's, was exceedingly vulnerable to Bulgarian attack. Istanbul is less than one hundred fifty kilometers from the Bulgarian frontier. Greece, the Pact's initiator, held territory on the north shore of the Aegean Sea which both had a substantial Slavic population and, worse, had been part of Bulgaria immediately before World War I. The Greek army was also critically short of both tanks and anti-tank guns. The original Greek description of the Balkan Alliance to Acheson had been quite frank in its anti-Bulgarian orientation. Greece also may have had designs on Albania; Greek Field Marshal Alexander Papagos had argued in a newspaper article that a Balkan Pact could neutralize Bulgaria and Albania in the event of World War III. Should the need arise, Bulgaria and Albania could be neutralized before World War III.

Enumerating what the states of the Balkan Pact had to gain from alliance should not overshadow what they gave up to get it. Yugoslavia and Greece managed to overlook the recent border incursions from Yugoslavia into Greece and the vexing problem of Macedonia. Though ethnic hatred between Greeks and Turks would ultimately destroy the Balkan Pact, Greece and Turkey managed to submerge ancient animosity beneath contemporary needs, at least for a few years. All of these states saw a real threat to their security and territorial integrity from the Soviet Union and its satellites, and that managed to overpower their uneasiness at association with partners they did not completely trust.

In addition to the signing of the Pact of Ankara, two other events in the first months of 1953 radically changed American policy in the Balkans. On January 20, 1953, Dwight Eisenhower was inaugurated as President of the United States, and on March 5, Josef Stalin died in Moscow. Strangely enough, Stalin's death and the creation of the Balkan Pact had far more important effects on American policy in the Balkans than did the transition from the Truman to the Eisenhower administration.

The Balkan states did not perceive John Foster Dulles's replacement of Dean Acheson as Secretary of State as a smooth transition. They instead saw Dulles as an active opponent of their newly-signed, Acheson-endorsed Balkan Pact. Ironically, American historiography has by contrast portrayed Dulles as afflicted by "pactomania"—pushing for regional alliances at every opportunity. Both these views are vast oversimplifications of the truth. Dulles did act as much more of a brake on the development of the Balkan
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Pact than Acheson ever had, but surface policy should not be confused with deeper principles. Dulles and Acheson shared fundamentally identical beliefs on the advantages and dangers of a Balkan alliance; only the circumstances in which they acted changed.

Put simply, the signing of the Pact of Ankara altered the environment in which America had to act. The Pact signed on February 28, 1953 was one of "friendship and cooperation," not military alliance. But military alliance was the next, logical step, and that possibility created an entirely new set of complications. The Yugoslavs pressed the Greeks and Turks for staff talks and joint military preparations, up to and including automatic plans to go into effect in the event of any aggression against any Pact member. The obvious danger, from the point of view of the United States, came from Greece and Turkey's membership in NATO, and the chance of drawing NATO into a war that the United States did not wish to fight. A military alliance might also suggest to the Soviets that aggressive moves were likely to follow, a fear that the Balkan states did little to allay. At a diplomatic reception in Athens soon after the signing of the Pact of Ankara, the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires Chernyhev approached the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey "in considerable agitation" and demanded: "What do you think you are doing? Don't you realize you are encircling us? Have you no regard for the peace of the world? What are your intentions in regard to Bulgaria?" Turkish Foreign Minister Köprülü remarked to Greek Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos that "Greece and Turkey were obviously proceeding along correct lines since they had been successful in making Chernyhev nervous."

Acheson and other diplomats in the State Department had consistently expressed precisely these concerns about automatic commitments and accidental war before the signing of the Balkan Pact. For example, Acheson had commented to the Embassy in France on December 5, 1952 that while Greek-Turk-Yugoslav "contingent" planning (that is, without provisions for automatic action) was fine, there should be no commitment of forces at this time. He repeated these concerns to the Embassy in Greece on January 7. These concerns were, however, without significance when there was no formal relationship at all among the three states. By the time Dulles reached office, the prospect of extremely tight links between Yugoslavia and NATO, too close for Dulles's comfort, was imminent and real. Within two months after the signing of the Pact of Ankara, American diplomats were already nervously asking whether the Balkan Pact had the potential to entangle NATO; a formal military alliance could only make the problem worse.

Though the possibility of military alliance between Yugoslavia was the foremost concern of American policy, America's delicate relationship with Italy also influenced its opposition to tightening the ties among the states of the Balkan Entente. In fact, at one conversation with Turkish Prime Minister Mendezes, the only reason Dulles gave for delaying the conversion of the Balkan Pact into a military alliance was the sensitivity of negotiations over the city of Trieste as he could hardly tell the Turks that the United States might not fight for them. Trieste had been under Allied occupation since World War II, and a dispute over who would possess the city represented a continuing obstacle to friendly relations between Italy and Yugoslavia, though the Yugoslavs did at one point suggest that Italy might join the Pact of Ankara. The Italians saw in Yugoslavia's move towards alignment with Greece and Turkey an attempt to curry favor with the West and checkmate Italy in the negotiations over Trieste, and some American officials agreed with them. To protect their stake in Trieste, the Italians had kept a very close eye on the Balkan Pact negotiations since the first hints of a Greek-Turk-Yugoslav agreement and urged restraint on all who would listen. They were ably assisted by Clare Boothe Luce, the American ambassador to Italy, who at every opportunity argued the Italian case to Eisenhower and Dulles and warned that Italy was but one foreign policy failure away from a collapse into communism.

In an attempt to placate Italian fears and expedite final agreement, Turkey made an eleventh-hour attempt to bring Italy into the approaching military alliance as a charter member. Italy was willing to accept this move; even after the Pact had been signed without Italian participation, a counselor at the Italian embassy in Washington lamented that "Italy was a willing bride ready to be led to the altar whenever a proposal was made." But Greece was "perplexed" by the Turkish suggestion, and Yugoslavia was actively hostile, claiming rightly or wrongly that Italy's move was not motivated by any wish to join the Pact but rather a desire to delay and delay completion of negotiations in an attempt to retain Trieste. Nothing ever came of the Turkish proposals.

In May and June of 1954, when it had become clear that a military alliance based on the Balkan Entente was imminent, the United States, Great...
Britain, and France began frantic efforts to control the sort of treaty that would emerge from the Balkan Pact. The French suggested a meeting of experts to discuss the problem, but the Americans were certain that such a meeting "would probably come to the attention of one or another of interested powers with undesirable results," so the discussion was instead confined to diplomatic channels. On May 30 the American Embassy in Ankara reported that an agreement in principle on a military alliance would soon be reached. Italy's concerns over Trieste were, for the members of the Balkan Pact, insignificant. As the Turks saw it, any strengthening of the Balkan Pact would automatically make Italy more secure, and the Turkish government could not in any event postpone such an important treaty on the basis of such a "secondary" concern as Trieste. Three days later, Dulles told Menderes that "the timing of any move to convert [the Pact of Ankara] to a military alliance should be very carefully considered."

At the same time, the US, France, and the United Kingdom were conferring secretly to sort through a tangled web of concerns. They wished to control the timing of any military alliance in order to not ruin the negotiations over Trieste, ensure that the language of any military agreement would leave NATO freedom of action, and accomplish all this without revealing to the Greeks and Turks that they were acting in concert. In late June, Dulles urged the British and French to take a turn at pressing the Balkan states to take Western misgivings into consideration, while he also suggested that they avoid the appearance of impropriety by not specifying too closely the precise actions France, Britain, and America wished taken. It was "most important to avoid giving the Greeks and Turks the impression they were being badgered by the US, the UK, and France." This would only "irritate" them. Nothing was achieved over the next two weeks, and by July 9 the State Department believed time was too short to work out the "exact language or approach or text which we wish to see the Greeks, Turks, and Yugoslavs produce." As the United States had urged restraint in May, Dulles was forced to rely on Britain and France and counted on their priorities being close enough to his to be acceptable.

Britain, France, and America never succeeded in coordinating their efforts or even specifying their goals, but it is unlikely that the tripartite powers, even had they been well-organized, could have slowed the Balkan march towards alliance. The interests of the tripartite powers too clearly differed from those of Greece and Turkey. America, France, and Britain all wished to maintain their freedom of action by maintaining a safe distance from Yugoslavia; Greece and Turkey had nothing to lose and much to gain from close association with Yugoslavia, and so tried to speed the negotiations towards military alliance while simultaneously pushing for full NATO membership for the Yugoslavs. The West could not openly reveal its opposition to military alliance without risking serious Greek and Turk resentment. Thus, American attempts to restrain their energetic smaller allies were ultimately unsuccessful. When urged to slow the pace of negotiations, the Greeks blamed the Turks for going too fast and claimed to be urging restraint themselves, the Turks blamed the Greeks, and each party blamed the Yugoslavs for excessive zeal in working for military alliance. Dzhengiz Khakov has commented that "if Turkey and Greece had pressed for a more rapid signing of the Ankara Treaty, then it was Yugoslavia which was pressing for its more rapid expansion into an alliance." In fact, all three states were moving equally rapidly towards alliance; Greece and Turkey only had to assure the United States that the rapid progress was someone else's fault.

Lengthy military negotiations culminated in the creation of a military alliance on August 9, 1954, the Treaty of Bled, which provided for cooperation among armed forces of the three states and, in particular, staff planning. American efforts to limit the scope of the treaty resulted only in the following clause:

This Treaty does not affect and cannot be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of Turkey and Greece under the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949. This did not really answer American concerns; staff plans still worked towards immediate military response by all parties in the event of aggression.

The period of actual military alliance among the three states was short-lived, but sources within the Greek military kept American policy-makers well-informed on the progress of the Pact and on Yugoslavia's increasingly uncooperative attitude. Yugoslavia's eagerness for military cooperation dissolved once a treaty had in fact been signed. The Greek military complained about the Yugoslavs' particular refusal to adopt specific plans and to discuss any issues involving nuclear weapons. The Yugoslavs argued that there was too great a risk of needlessly provoking the Soviets
with military agreements in a time in which relations between the East and
West seemed more and more stable. Tito told Dulles quite frankly that,
though the Balkan Pact was still useful, the Balkans were very calm and
there was no immediate danger of Soviet attack. 40 Here Stalin's death plays
a vital role in Balkan politics: his successors adopted a peace offensive
against Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia which succeeded in convincing
those states that there was no longer such an immediate danger of war.
Diplomatic pressure on Turkey over the Straits question eased, and the
Soviets tempered their anti-Yugoslav rhetoric. The Balkan states' belief in
the urgent need for the Balkan Pact declined, and old curiosities resurfaced.
On September 6, 1955, the Turkish consulate in Saloniki was bombed,
triggering anti-Greek riots in Turkey. These events coincided with a revival
of the Cyprus question, effectively ending any cooperation between Greece
and Turkey. At the time of the Greek-Turk split, the Yugoslav government
had already been trying to distance itself from the Pact, but not to break
away entirely. The chill in Greek-Turk relations was more than the
Yugoslavs had bargained for, but they made no great attempts to salvage the
Pact. 41 By 1956, the Balkan Pact had become a dead letter.

Despite the short life of the Balkan Pact, it cannot be seen as an
aberration in the political history of Eastern Europe. The Balkan Pact
dissociated only when the need for it disappeared. As long as Greece,
Turkey, and Yugoslavia perceived a clear need for cooperation, ethnic and
historical animosities did not prevent effective political collaboration.
The states of the Balkan Entente managed to produce a military alliance that
suited their needs despite resistance from their senior partners in NATO.
Such an accomplishment cannot be the result either of American bidding,
or of diplomatic luck.

NOTES

1. For portrayals of the Balkan Pact as aberration, see Tanan Balchali, Greek-
Turkish Relations Since 1925 (Boulder: Westview, 1990), 13:36, Dagga Baxhright Sezir,
"Turkey's Security Policies," 79;% in Jonathan Alford, Greece and Turkey: Adversity in Alliance
(New York: St. Martin's, 1984), and Andrew Bostrom, The Mediterranean Peal (New York:
Prager, 1983) 240. For the Balkan Pact as American question, see Zhaojing Hahow,
is an excellent contemporary history of the Balkan Pact, but lacks access to documents,
particularly on American policy.

2. Memorandum of Conversation: Dean Acheson with Constantin Tsaldaris and
Vassilli Dendramis, October 28, 1949, in Greece: Military Assistance Program, Records of the
Military Advisor to the Office of Near East, South Asian, and African Affairs—1945-1950, RG
59, National Archives.

3. On American perceptions, see Marc Trachtenberg, "A 'Wasting Asset':

4. R. H. Hillekens, "Memorandum: Recent Developments in Southeastern
Europe," 9 July 1950; Joint Intelligence Committee, ICS 1924/15, "Recent Military Activity
in the Balkans," 9 July 1950, in Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: the Soviet Union: Part II:
I946—1953 reel 1, fr. 351-4.

5. CIA ORE 44-49, "Estimate of the Yugoslav Regime's Ability to Resist Soviet
Pressure during 1949," 2 June 1949; and CIA National Intelligence Estimate 7, "The Current

6. Acheson to certain offices, August 2, 1950, Foreign Relations of the United
States 1950, III:175; Acheson to Embassy in Iran, August 17, 1950, FRUS 1950, III:219.


8. Acheson to Embassy in Greece, August 17, 1950, ibid., 220.

9. Minor (Greece) to Acheson, August 24, 1950, ibid., 246.

10. Department of State Paper "Security of Greece and Turkey," September 11,
1950, ibid., 284.

11. A. C. Davis for the ICS to Johnson, 9 September 1950, General Records of the
Department of State, Records of the Military Advisor to the Office of Near Eastern, South
Asian, and African Affairs, Military Assistance Program—Turkey, Box 1, Entry 457, RG 59.


14. Acheson to Embassy in Greece, August 17, 1950, ibid., 220; Grady (Iran) to

15. Minutes of US delegation, 3rd Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, New York,
Committee of the North Atlantic Council," September 13, 1950, ibid., 254-5; Webb to certain
offices, September 18, 1950, ibid., 268-7; Memorandum of Conversation, Acheson and Eriso,
September 19, 1950, ibid., 233-7; Statement of the United States to See State, April 8, 1949, in
Turkey 1945—55, Miscellaneous Lot Files 592, Box 7 (Miscellaneous Office Files of the Assistant
Secretary of State for European Affairs, 1943—1957), National Archives.

42-3.

17. Kretzmann to State, March 4, 1954, 668:813-4, State Dept. of Declassified
Files, National Archives (hereafter "Declassified Files" will be omitted).

18. Acheson to Ankara, March 12, 1952, 760:53—1352; Webb to Embassy in
Turkey, February 13, 1952, FRUS 1952, VIII:591; Montegue Stairs, Entangled Allies: US